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Abstract  
Material from North East India provides clues to explain both state breakdown as well as its 
avoidance. They point to the particular historical trajectory of interaction of state-making 
leaders and other social forces, and the divergent authority structure that took shape, as 
underpinning this difference. In Manipur, where social forces retained their authority, the 
state’s autonomy was compromised. This affected its capacity, including that to resolve group 
conflicts. Here powerful social forces politicized their narrow identities to capture state 
power, leading to competitive mobilisation and conflicts. State’s poor capacity has facilitated 
frequent breakdown in Manipur. In Mizoram, where state-making leaders managed to 
incorporate other social forces within their authority structure, state autonomy was 
enhanced. This has helped enhance state capacity and its ability to resolve conflicts. Crucial 
to this dynamic in Mizoram was the role of state-making leaders inventing and mobilising an 
overarching and inclusive identity to counter entrenched social forces. This has helped with 
social cohesion.      
 
Introduction 
North East India, comprising the ‘seven sister’ states,1 has experienced sustained conflicts. 
This has mostly been along ethnic lines and has led to sustained violence and breakdown. 
Manipur’s has been a particularly demonstrative example of this dynamic. In media and 
policy circles, it has often been considered an extreme case of breakdown, even by North-
eastern standards.2 On the other hand, Mizoram has been taken to be a peaceful state.3 
Commentators have attributed the violence in the North East region to identity politics. They 
have interpreted Mizoram’s apparent peace as proof of the absence of identity politics there.4 
A closer look at politics in the state will quickly dispel this notion.5 Much of the politics in 
Mizoram, like that in Manipur, centres on the question of identity. Political parties and public 
organisations in either state have used ethnic identities to mobilise support among their 
constituents. Yet ethnic mobilisation in the two states, indeed in the region, has not led to 
similar outcomes.  
                                                
1 Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura.    
2 ‘Violence on the rise in Northeast: Manipur the worst sufferer’, Times of India (Guwahati) 5 June 2003, 
quoting Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, Annual Report 2002-2003. The Ministry’s Annual 
Report 2004-2005 demonstrates similar results (www.mha.nic.in). According to another report, “If the first two-
odd months of year 2005 are any indication, the militancy-ridden state of Manipur appears to be moving into a 
more vicious cycle of violence” (Bibhu Prasad Routrey, South Asia Intelligence Review, Weekly Assessment and 
Review, 3:35 (14 March 2005).    
3 “Mizoram has tasted and savoured peace for seventeen years now. After two decades of insurgency and its 
related sufferings, peace has been sweet indeed” (‘Brave New Phase of Mizoram’, Telegraph (Guwahati), 22 
August 2003.     
4 Neera Chandhoke, ‘A State of One’s Own: Secessionism and Federalism in India’, Paper presented at Crisis 
States Programme Annual Workshop, London, August 2005. 
5 See Manorama Sharma & Apurba K Baruah, ‘Mizoram at Crossroads: Democracy vs. Traditional Values’, 
Crisis States Programme Annual Workshop, New Delhi, December 2004.     
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The difference in violence between the two states is particularly puzzling given the apparent 
commonalities between them. Both states are multi-ethnic in make-up, though admittedly 
Manipur more so. Both are composite states of the Indian union and thus exist in a similar 
context in the Indian federal set-up.  Further the political economy of the Northeast region 
impacts on the two states in equal measure. Both states have long and porous international 
borders, and lie on the cross-border drugs and small arms trade routes that hook up to 
international markets. They are also in a similar economic situation, with a poor resource 
base, inadequate physical and social infrastructure and rising unemployment. So why has 
Mizoram not experienced the ethnic turmoil and breakdown that characterises politics in 
Manipur and most other states in the region?   
 
In this paper I attempt to analyse the difference between Manipur and Mizoram to arrive at 
answers to these question. Part of the answer may lie in the manner of political mobilisation 
and consequent elite contestations in the two states. But I would argue that the most 
significant explanation for the difference lies in the state and its relationship with society. The 
process of state making, the social forces that state-making leaders had to contend with, the 
strategies they employed to confront these forces, the outcome of these contests and their 
implications for the state’s autonomy and its relationship with minority communities are 
dynamics that I consider crucial to understanding the difference. It is to the conditions that 
enhance or limit state power, the compulsions of political actors that led to processes fostering 
inclusive or fragmented identities and the resultant capacity of the state to behave 
autonomously or otherwise in response to community-based demands that I think we need to 
direct our attention to.   
 
The paper begins with a brief survey of the literature on conflicts in Manipur and Mizoram, 
followed by a brief discussion of the conceptual tools I use and a synopsis of my argument. 
The body of the paper is divided into three parts. In the first, I look at the historical state-
making experience of the two states, their contests with social forces and the outcome of these 
contests on authority structures.  In the second, I explore why and how state-making leaders 
in the two states, in the years immediately before and after Independence, mobilised ethnic 
identities in divergent ways: inclusive and aggregating in one, partisan and fragmented in the 
other. In the third section I analyse the impact of divergent authority structures and varying 
modes of identity mobilisation on the state’s capacity to govern and to incorporate minority 
demands and respond to the latter’s grievances. Finally, I try to draw some empirical 
conclusions from the material.    
 
Existing explanations  
Ethnic conflicts and violence in Northeast India have been explained using both primordial 
and instrumental lenses. Scholars, mostly from the region, have pointed to fundamental 
cultural differences between people in the region and those   from ‘mainland India’. This 
incompatibility has motivated them to question the ‘unequal’ and ‘forced’ integration of the 
Northeast region into the Indian ‘mainstream’.6 Historians like Sanajaoba trace the problem to 
the forced integration of Manipur into India and the subsequent development of master-
subject relationship between the two, reinforced by a colonial pattern of political, economic 
and cultural dominance.7 They argue that this seriously undermined the integrity of the state 
                                                
6 P. S. Datta, ‘Roots of Insurgency’, Seminar 366, Northeast Special Number (February 1990).  
7 N. Sanajaoba, Manipur Past and Present, New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1988. See also Lokendra Arambam, 
‘Language, Identities and Crisis in Manipur’s Civilization’, Imphal Free Press, Special edition: Selected 
Writings on Issues of Identity, 2003.     
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and led to frustrations that fed into ethnic conflicts. Others have tended to see things from an 
instrumental perspective. They have pointed to rapid modernisation as the explanation for the 
region’s instability.8 Some writers point to the unequal power structure and intra-community 
competition over resources to account for the region’s many conflicts.9 Others have 
emphasised the class bases of these conflicts, pointing to the clash between the ‘new class’ 
and the traditional elite.10 Similar political outcomes in India generally have been explained 
by looking at the characteristics and the working of the state.11 They attribute India’s rising 
ethnic and community conflicts, including those in the North East region, to changes in 
political institutions and to choices of leaders.12 Kohli asserts that institutional vacuum and 
intensification of democratic politics have together caused the political breakdown that one 
notices in the country. The shape these breakdowns take depends on how well central 
authority is institutionalised and how willing ruling groups are to share power and resources 
with mobilised groups.13 Baruah resorts to similar historical institutionalism to explain the 
North East’s “durable disorder”.  He argues that much of the pathology in the region is the 
outcome of the central state’s weakness to monopolise security, its disembeddedness from 
society and its reliance on militarist tactics to respond to challenges posed by militias in the 
region. The central state’s counter-insurgency policy in the region is accompanied by a 
tolerance for suspension of the rule of law, authoritarianism and large-scale leakages of 
development funds. This creates opportunities for insurgent dividends. Baruah claims that 
public policies promoting self-governance for particular communities contribute to the 
disorder. They encourage competitive mobilisation by other groups not so privileged, 
resulting in sustained conflicts.14           
 
Cultural and instrumental analyses, deinstitutionalisation of polity, leadership options and the 
political economy of insurgency may explain the intensification (or decline) of community 
conflicts in India generally. However, they fail to satisfactorily explain variance in violence 
outcome between comparable cases, such as within North East India. Most parts of the region 
were subjected to rapid modernisation, but it did not have an equally unsettling impact. 
Mizoram shows this. Group conflicts over power and resources are common to most 
developing societies, as much in Manipur as in Mizoram. But if these were more serious in 
Manipur, why was this so? What lies behind this divergence? And how and why has Mizoram 
seemingly avoided such contestation? Further, deinstitutionalisation of the central polity 
should have affected both Manipur and Mizoram in similar ways. Central leaders have 
                                                
8 See B. P. Singh, The Problem of Change: A Study of North East India, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1987.  
9 U. A. Shimray, ‘Socio-Political Unrest in the Region Called Northeast India’, Economic and Political Weekly,  
16 October 2004. 
10 Walter Fernandez, ‘Conflicts in NE India: A Historical Perspective’, Economic and Political Weekly, 18 
December 1999, pp.3579-3582; A. Bimol Akoijam, ‘How History Repeats Itself?’ Economic and Political 
Weekly, 28 July 2001, pp.2807-2812.  
11 Kohli argues that this is because in India, the state occupies a dominant political space, controlling most 
resources and opportunities. Further, ‘development’ in India is a political process, with the state itself being 
accessible via this process. As a consequence the state becomes both the object and the arena of the continuing 
contests between social groups all of whom seek to control the state (Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent: 
India’s Growing Crisis of Governability, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).    
12 Amrita Basu & Atul Kohli, Can Democracies Accommodate Ethnic Nationalism? Community Conflicts and 
the State in India, Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1998. pp.2-3.   
13 Atul Kohli, ‘The Rise and Decline of Self Determination Movements in India’, in Amrita Basu et al. (eds), 
Can Democracies Accommodate Ethnic Nationalism? Community Conflicts and the State in India, Calcutta: 
Oxford University Press, 1998, p.7.   
14 Sanjib Baruah, Durable Disorder: Understanding the Politics of Northeast India, New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2005, pp.3-27.  
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themselves shown equal flexibility (or intransigence) in dealing with mobilised groups and 
separatist insurgencies across the Northeast. Yet while Mizoram is on the verge of entering 
the twenty-first year of its post-Peace Accord era, peace has eluded Manipur for most of its 
post-colonial existence.     
 
My own thoughts of Manipur are filled with memories of mobilisation and counter-
mobilisation by contesting identity groups, of the state’s complex ethnic dynamics and its 
never-ending violence. But what struck me most during my work there was the poor 
legitimacy of the state. Agencies of the state in Manipur are commonly criticised for their 
slothfulness, their insensitivity, and their inability to do any good. Though the state’s minority 
tribal communities have more to complain about than its majority, criticism of how the state 
functions is universal. Protests, street marches and bandhs (forced closures) are daily 
occurrences. By contrast, the clearest insight that emerged from my fieldwork in Mizoram 
was the positive public perception of the state there. Discussions with academics, as well as 
journalists and human rights activists, reveal that the state is seen as being able to deliver and 
be accommodative to minority demands. It has a sense of ‘legitimacy’ and is less an object of 
criticism. But what could explain this difference? Why is the state apparently benign in 
Mizoram when dealing with public demands while it appears to be malignant in Manipur?  
 
Empirical insights again provide useful directions here. One aspect of the seeming ‘disorder’ 
in Manipur I noticed was the ease with which different social organisations constantly 
challenge the authority of the state to order people’s lives. While a variety of armed militant 
groups have thrown the ultimate challenge to the state, collecting ‘loyalty taxes’ and defining 
who will wear what clothes and what textbooks will be taught in schools, even ‘civil society’ 
organisations such as student and community groups constantly challenge the state and take 
upon themselves the role of rule-makers. The precariousness of the state in Manipur is stark. 
Mizoram’s was a very distinct state-society dynamic. Here there was little of the sense of 
constant and competitive struggles over who will define rules or who will order people’s 
lives. The state-society contest appeared muted, the general impression being one of state 
agencies and civil society organisations working in tandem, and avoiding breakdown. While 
realising the normative implications of this compact, the difference between patterns of state-
society relations between the two states was marked. I believe it is by analysing this 
difference in state- society relations that we can understand the difference in conflict outcome 
in the two states.  
 
Conceptual tools  
Central to discussions over state-society relations is the issue of state power: where it lies, 
how it is grounded, and what social forces shape it; and whether those forces constrain and 
compromise state power or augment and reinforce it. State power has a bearing on the state’s 
autonomy and its capacity to govern. Equally, it impacts on the state’s ability to manage 
conflicts. Understanding difference in state capacity and autonomy may thus benefit from 
exploring the nature of state power. Any analysis of state power itself needs to begin with an 
understanding of the historical emergence and crystallisation of the state and the various 
struggles that have happened between state-making leaders and their opponents over social 
control. State-making leaders face opposition from entrenched social forces who seek to 
provide alternative sources of authority. The outcome of these contests determines whether 
state-making leaders have been able to incorporate those social forces into the state’s 
structure, or if they exist outside, continuing to act as alternative centres of power. These 
determine state power. Therefore it is important to explore state making historically.  
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Equally important is the need to understand the particular strategies that state-making leaders 
have employed to respond to social forces. In their struggle over authority, state-making 
leaders and social forces that confront them have frequently politicised ethnic identities to 
gain advantage. Political parties, community elites and public organisations have been the 
most active in these struggles over power and authority. But the basis and manner of identity 
mobilisation can be very different; it can be narrow, confined to the dominant community 
while excluding all others, or it can be inclusive, taking different communities along. The 
form of mobilisation would undoubtedly depend on cultural affinities, but also on leadership 
strategies and choice. Important is the effect that the particular form of mobilisation has upon 
inter-community dynamics as well as on the state’s capacity to govern. Where mobilisation is 
inclusive and participatory, the state should be in a better position to respond to minority 
demands and take on board their concerns. Narrow identity mobilisation engenders counter 
mobilisation by excluded groups. It also limits the state’s autonomy and its capacity to govern 
and uphold the rule of law, which in turn contributes to conflicts and violence. It is these 
dynamics around state and society in the two states that I address in this paper.           
 
The paper sketches out the divergent historical trajectories of state making in the two states. It 
explores how in Manipur the state sought to establish its local authority through forging 
alliances with community specific political organizations (chiefs and tribal fora, for example) 
rather than by establishing direct rule throughout the territory.  These alliances ultimately led 
to a weakened state structure and continued existence of exclusive political organisations of 
different communities. State-making leaders sought to capture state power by politicising the 
ethnicity of the dominant community. The state has sought to make up for its weaknesses by 
creating a ‘legitimising core’ in the Metei identity. This has excluded and in turn alienated the 
minorities. Conflicts between different communities, where the state frequently acts as a 
partisan actor, have worsened in the 1990s, perhaps due to rising socio-economic challenges. 
In Mizoram there was an attempt by the state and political actors to incorporate competing 
social forces into a unified whole within the state. The state was able to enhance its strengths 
at the cost of exclusive social and political institutions. State-making leaders reinforced this 
strength by grounding state power in a unified and relatively inclusive identity that they 
devised and access to which was kept open to all who speak the Lushai language and share a 
Christian faith, but was itself an “exclusionary” identify since some minorities, like Buddhist 
Chakmas, were never seen as Mizos. The process of creating a Mizo identity has empowered 
the state to better respond to ethnic demands and has helped it manage conflicts. I elaborate 
this argument below using empirical evidence gleaned from ethnographic accounts, archival 
records, public and private documents, press reports and from interviews with numerous 
informants.   
 
Struggles over authority: State-making in Manipur and Mizoram 
I begin by looking at the history of state making in the two states, to understand the conditions 
and processes that went into creating the sort of authority structure that we find in each. I 
explore historically the genesis of state power, and look at the struggles that took place 
between state-making leaders and traditional centres of authority in pre-colonial, colonial and 
post-colonial times, to understand how state power is grounded. I also test whether social 
control is integrated in the state or if it is fragmented between the state and the many social 




Fragmentation of state power in Manipur 
Manipur’s valley region has traditionally been home to many ethnic groups and clans, all at 
war with each other, jostling for supremacy. It was the Ningthouja clan led by Nongda 
Pakhangba that emerged victorious. They established their kingdom at Kangla in present day 
Imphal. The maharaja was the centre of authority, owning all land in the state, and allotting it 
to his subjects on payment of rent. There existed a reasonably developed land revenue system 
with officials at the central and local levels to supervise cultivation and collect rent. The state 
made demands on its subjects, and was able to force compliance. For instance every adult 
male was obliged to perform lallup, or free labour for the state, for ten days in every forty. 
Social and political consolidation in the Valley, leading to state formation and concentration 
of authority in the maharaja helped bring about stability and order. These post-colonial 
developments were generally limited to the Valley part of the state.15   
 
Hill communities were divided into two main constellations: Nagas, inhabiting the north, east 
and the west of the Valley and Kukis dispersed in small settlements all around, but mostly in 
the south. There was little unity among these tribes. The village was the highest unit of 
political organisation among hill-dwellers. Each village itself was a collection of clans 
claiming a common descent.16 Inter-village contacts were limited, most villages being usually 
at war with each other. The Naga village system was broadly democratic with village heads 
enjoying little hereditary authority or rights over land. There usually was a consultative 
council of village elders to govern the village and resolve disputes. Each village had its own 
‘sovereign’ chief, there being no central authority to which villages owed allegiance.17 Land 
belonged to the village settler (nampou) who was usually not the village head (khulakpa). But 
the nampou was not a landowner in the traditional sense of the word. He received only a 
token rent from tillers. Village headmen and council members were men of influence but not 
necessarily the wealthiest people.  
 
The Kuki system, in contrast, was centralised with Kuki chiefs (ningthou) being head of the 
village and owner of all its land. Ningthous were also entirely supported by their subject 
villagers for their day-to-day requirements. Villagers usually cultivated the chief’s fields, 
giving him “a share of the game and presents during marriage or child birth”.18 Kuki chiefship 
was strictly hereditary. But common to both the Naga and Kuki system was the autonomy of 
village institutions. There was no overarching authority. Even the Manipuri Maharaja’s 
control over the hill chiefs was shifting and informal.19       
 
The British annexed Manipur in 1891 and soon initiated administrative changes, most 
significantly in land revenue and judicial systems. Reformed land revenue administration led 
to permanent settlement of agricultural land, involving the issuance of land documents to 
tillers and payment of revenue in cash by them to the state. Taxes on homestead lands were 
also introduced. In the judicial realm, special courts were abolished and the system of courts 
was streamlined. Legal codes that the British had introduced in the rest of the country were 
introduced in Manipur as well.20 All these changes consolidated the colonial hold on the state. 
In 1907, the authority of the maharaja was restored. He was put at the head of the newly 
                                                
15 See T. C. Hodson, The Meitheis, London: Macmillan, 1908.     
16 Hodson (1908), p.555.    
17 Hodson (1908), p.120. 
18 R. Brown’s account of the Kuki village system, quoted in N. Sanajaoba (2003), p.144.    
19 Report of the Chief Minister’s Social Policy Advisory Committee, Manipur 1995-1997, Imphal: Government 
of Manipur, 1997, pp.34-35.     
20 Indian Penal Code (1860), Criminal Procedure Code (1898). 
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constituted State Durbar made up of six Manipuri members with an English officer as its 
Vice President.21 But as elsewhere in colonial India, veto power remained with the British 
Political Agent, while the state ruler held a subordinate position. An outcome of this 
arrangement was competition between the two centres of state authority, the Political Agent 
and the Maharaja. This would adversely affect stability.    
 
These colonial interventionist measures were confined to the Valley and did not extend to the 
vast surrounding forested hill tracts. These were generally unattended, being left to the 
Political Agent and Vice President of the state durbar to conduct periodic expeditions in order 
to keep peace. The state made no effort to incorporate the hills into the state-wide judicial or 
land-revenue system or to encourage hill communities to be represented in the newly-
established state-level governing institutions. Subsequent measures to enhance the state’s 
presence in the Hills also fell short of penetrating far enough to establish effective control 
through centralised .22 Each village was left to its autonomous self-containment, guided and 
governed by its own sets of customary laws and codes. The state kept its formal presence in 
the Hills thin and relied on pre-existing centres of power to do its bidding. It authorised local 
chieftains to maintain order in their jurisdiction and to collect taxes from their subjects, 
allowing a small part of this to be retained by the chief.  
 
What were the consequences of these policies? In the Hills, the state’s reliance on local 
chieftains and its allocation to them of authority to tax and police the populace prevented the 
state from consolidating its own authority and control. The policy helped to amply reinforce 
the authority of the chiefs and other traditional local centres of power. Throughout the 
colonial period, village chiefs and headmen remained in positions of strength in Manipur. 
Though the state had successfully contained them when they rose in rebellion, its reluctance 
to either replace or fully incorporate these power centres meant that the state was always 
dependent upon them. In fact, traditional symbols and authority were further consolidated in 
colonial times, as the state relied on these centres of traditional authority as its agents and 
front-men to penetrate society and gain the legitimacy it needed to be able to rule.  
 
Such duality could be seen in the Valley, too. Though the colonial state had the means to rule 
on its own, it chose to do so through the Manipuri Maharaja. Yet the ultimate political 
authority rested with the Political Agent. This anomaly placed the Maharaja at a disadvantage, 
with little political control. Singh has demonstrated how the Maharaja sought to respond to 
this challenge by enhancing his social authority as compensation.23 This he attempted by 
actively taking up religious reform and revival.24 As a consequence, the state’s authority 
remained limited. People saw the state as being foreign and as a usurper. It was also seen as 
being unsympathetic to local interests and promoting a divergent world view. The economic 
impact of colonial rule on the lives of the people added to the disquiet. These dynamics 
facilitated a state-society break. Beginning in the early twentieth century, there was a series of 
popular movements in Manipur against colonial policies.25 The state, by following different 
policies for the Hills and the Valley, also created and sustained many fresh divides between 
the two. This further compromised the state’s social control over the populace.  
                                                
21 For a survey of administrative changes in this period see ‘The Administration of the State of Manipur from 13-
9-1891 to 15-5-1907’, Manipur State Archives File (Manipur SA) # R-1/S-C, 317- Political.    
22 Rules for the Administration of Hills 1919, Government of Manipur 
23 N. Lokendra Singh, The Unquiet Valley: Society, Economy and Politics in Manipur (1891-1950), New Delhi: 
Mittal Publications, 1998, p.44. 
24 State-led religious zeal proved detrimental to inter-community relations in the state, especially as exclusive-
caste Hindu symbols began to be reinforced, disadvantaging non-Hindu tribal communities.   
25 The Nupi Lan Movement of 1902-04 and the uprising of 1931, both led by women, were significant. 
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In sum, it can be said that though the colonial state in Manipur had ample opportunity to draw 
hill communities into reforms taking place in the rest of the state and to establish centralised 
political and administrative institutions, it chose to behave in ways that strengthened localised 
institutions and village autonomy. Chiefs and councils relied on customary codes and 
traditional authority to emphasise their social control. This promoted narrow identities and 
divisions. Old rewards, sanctions and myths remained more or less intact and could not be 
replaced with state-wide common reward structures. Similar dynamics in the Valley promoted 
state-society cleavages. Thus the early phase of state making in Manipur, during the colonial 
period, saw the fragmentation of authority structure into individual centres, each defined by 
narrow local identities. This would have profound consequences for state making in the post-
colonial period.  
 
Political authority in the state was restored to the Maharaja in 1947. The Instrument of 
Accession and the Standstill Agreement that the Maharaja signed with the central government 
resulted in Manipur, a ‘princely state’, being given political autonomy within the Indian 
dominion. In the meantime, popular pressure for constitutional reforms had pushed the 
Manipuri ruler to agree to the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. In 1948, elections 
were held to the newly established state assembly on the basis of full adult suffrage, a first in 
the country. However, in 1949, political developments in India and in Manipur’s own 
neighbourhood overtook the state. The preoccupation of the national leadership with nation 
building, their fears of a rising communist wave in the east from Burma and lobbying by a 
section of Manipuri political leaders for integration of the state within India, resulted in 
Manipur’s ‘merger’ with the Indian Union in 1949.26 From a princely state with a 
constitutional monarchy and a legislature elected on the basis of adult franchise, Manipur was 
made a ‘part c’ state of the Indian union, to be administered by the Centre, without a popular 
government. Chandhoke demonstrates how the merger agreement fundamentally changed the 
nature of politics in the state.27 While much of the frustration and anger over the event could 
be a case of history being reread to conform to the present, the significance of the agreement 
in distancing state institutions from society cannot be overemphasised.   
 
Relegation of Manipur to ‘part c’ status was a setback. Progress toward political development 
proved slow. The Manipur Advisory Council was the first post-merger deliberative body, set 
up in 1952, with members nominated by the government. The Territorial Council followed 
this in 1957. In 1963, Manipur was made a Union Territory, with top executive authority still 
with the unelected Chief Commissioner. Manipur was not made a state in its own right until 
1972, with an elected legislature and a government fully accountable to Manipuri society. 
Twenty-three years between ‘merger’ and ‘statehood’ caused a severe break between state 
and society. With little grounding in society, the centrally administered state began to be seen 
as ‘foreign’ and exclusive. The state bureaucracy acquired the image of being arrogant and 
not in touch with popular aspirations.  
       
Post-Independence state making in the Hills was equally problematic, with the central state 
seeking to enhance its limited bureaucratic presence. But as in colonial times, the state chose 
to depend for most of its administrative expansion on the old power structure of local chiefs 
and their advisors. In 1956, it enacted the Village Authority in Hill Areas Act (1956) and set 
up village authorities in every village. Though these were elected bodies, it was unelected 
                                                
26 With the Merger Agreement, the ruler ceded the power to govern the state to the Government of India.  
27 Chandhoke (2005), p.18. 
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village headmen who led them.28 Village authorities were given extensive administrative and 
judicial powers. Soon the ambit of their authority was expanded to include power to 
implement and monitor development programmes in the village. But elections to village 
bodies soon took on more ‘traditional’ forms with each clan nominating a member to the 
council, similar to the practice that existed in the past.  
 
The Village Authority Act and subsequent developments created a parallel power structure in 
the village.29 Though this act made a start in integrating customary courts into the official 
system, its successes were modest. The old system of village courts continued, and is 
community-specific, emphasising the salience of tribal institutions and their specific identity. 
Intra-community competitions over authority and resources have led to the legal system itself 
being turned into a contested arena. Increasingly, more vocal claimants to community 
resources and symbols, such as apex tribal organisations and armed groups, have been trying 
to dominate this space.30 A similar take-over by ‘powerful elements’ has taken place in the 
land-holding system. Land reforms introduced in the state in 1960 were confined to the valley 
areas.31 The Hills, which account for 70 per cent of the state’s area, are excluded from its 
purview. Tribal leaders are concerned about possible alienation of tribal lands to non-locals. 
Perhaps tribal leaders, mostly people with landed interests, are equally concerned about losing 
their traditional land rights.32 Consequently, land laws in hill areas are still governed by tribal 
customs and practices. These exist outside the state’s control and have not even been codified.  
 
A combination of factors has thus helped sustain and consolidate the authority of traditional 
social forces in Manipur’s Hills. It was no wonder the state’s initiative to abolish the system 
of village chieftainship failed miserably, despite an act to that effect having been passed in 
1968 in the State Assembly. Evidently the state’s political bureaucracy had not been able to 
muster adequate authority to confront entrenched interests. Failure to abolish chieftaincies 
meant links with the traditional past were not severed; and by putting the hereditary chiefs at 
the top of the elected village authorities, their traditional authority was enhanced. Having 
been incorporated in the administrative structure of the state, and also being the channel 
through which development funds flow, yet lacking in accountability, Village Authorities in 
the Hills have become sites of contestation for control between different social forces. Their 
appeal has been on identity lines. This has impacted not only on elections to village 
authorities, but also the larger character of tribal politics, which has become predominantly 
identity-based.  
 
New supra-village social bodies have emerged that are seeking to enhance their authority by 
playing institutional roles. For instance, in 1988 the Tangkhul Naga Long (TNL) compiled the 
shiyan tanza, or code of customary law, of the Tangkhuls and set up its court as a forum 
where intra- and inter-village disputes could be resolved based on customary laws and 
practices. This was posed as an alternative to the official courts. Today, most cases of disputes 
in villages in Ukhrul district are referred from the village councils to the TNL court, and not 
                                                
28 Village Authority (in Hill Areas) Act, 1956. Government of Manipur  
29 Interview, K. C. Bruno, member Tamenglong Khunjao Village Authority (Tamenglong Khunjao, 6 November 
2004).  
30 In 2005 it was  reported that customary courts and NSCN(IM), the armed militant group, imposed a heavy 
penalty on a girl accused of petty theft in Ukhrul district (‘NPMHR rejects verdict of Ato Longphang’, The 
Sangai Express, 21 September 2005).   
31 Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms (MLR & LR) Act 1960, Government of Manipur.  
32 It is Kuki chiefs who most vehemently opposed extension of MLR&LR Act to the hills. Today opposition to 
extension has become a symbol of tribal protest.  
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the courts set up by the government.33 Similarly the Zeliangrong Union (ZU) has taken the 
Zeliangrong community’s common customary code for its judicial activities. It has set up its 
own court to which disputes are referred by the village pei (council) for adjudication. Newly 
acquired judicial authority helps these organisations to play a leading role in mobilising their 
constituency and enhancing social control. Social forces have maintained their entrenched 
position in the valley part of the state too. The Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms 
(MLR&LR) Act was unable to do away with the large number of intermediaries in the state’s 
landholding system. The Act is seen as being less definitive on issues such as land-ownership 
ceilings and redistribution.34   
  
The state was thus weak and in its early state-making phase was unable to provide rewards 
and sanctions to the populace. The existence of traditional centres of power and their growing 
salience in this phase prevented the state from consolidating its authority. Traditional centres 
of power themselves were structured around specific identities. In the early post-colonial 
phase, they also saw the state as being ‘non-Manipuri’, distant and insensitive to local 
interests. To consolidate their position, they began strengthening community-based 
organisations, which implied mobilisation along ethnic lines. Instruments available to them 
were myths and symbols and identity politics. The multiplicity of autonomous centres of 
power meant that there would be multiple and consequent conflictual mobilisation. Poor state 
authority existing alongside multiple rule-makers has thus led to poor and fragmented social 
control in Manipur.  
 
 
State consolidation in Mizoram 
In Mizoram, hilly topography and shifting cultivation technology prevented the development 
of settled societies and concomitant state formation of the kind seen in Manipur’s valley 
region. But like Manipur’s hill areas, villages in Mizoram were autonomous, isolated and 
constantly at war with one another. However there did exist, among the ruling Sailo clan, a 
sense of hierarchy of chiefs, even if they were independent of each other.35 This, combined 
with inter-clan feuds and flows of goods leading to the concentration of wealth in the Sailo 
clan of the Lushai sub-tribe, enabled the development of some sort of supra-local authority.36 
Even though each village remained an autonomous unit and chiefs frequently clashed over 
dominance, it was the Sailo chiefs who by the early nineteenth century had gained control of 
the area.37  
 
The Lushai polity was composed of Hanmchawm, the ‘commoners’, governed by a chief of 
the Sailo clan who was aided by his officials. Commoners could rise to important positions in 
the chief’s administration, but could never become chiefs themselves.38 Sailo chiefs were 
despotic and were supported totally by tribute from commoners. They owned all land in the 
village. Commoners, who were made up of a large number of subsidiary clans and families, 
did not have much by way of individual rights. The burden on them was heavy. Chiefs could 
order capital punishment; seize food stores and properties of their villagers; order villagers to 
provide free labour; and demand payments. There were, however, limits to their powers over 
                                                
33 R. R. Shimray, Origin and the Culture of Nagas, New Delhi: Pimpheipei Shimray, 1985, pp.185-186. 
34 J. N. Das, A Study of the Land System of Manipur, Guwahati: Law Research Institute, 1989, pp.139-140. 
35 Robert Reid, History of Frontier Areas Bordering Assam (1883-1941), London: Eastern Publishing House, 
1942, p.4.  
36 R. Lehman, The Structure of Chin Society. Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1963 pp.27-28. 
37 A. G.  McCall, Lushai Chrysalis, London: Luzac & Co., 1949, pp.35-37.  
38 McCall (1949), p.96. 
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the their subjects. The latter could migrate to another village if the rule of the chief became 
difficult to bear. Chiefs depended on the Zawlbuak, the young men’s barracks, to provide 
security to the village from external threats and to enforce rules of discipline within. They 
also promoted Tlawmnghaina, the code of community obligation, which implied a sense of 
public service. Chiefs also supported the development of their duhlian dialect among their 
subjects.39  
 
The Chin-Lushai Expedition of 1889-90 led to the conquest and incorporation of the Lushai 
Hills into British India. This was followed by administrative changes required by the state to 
maintain peace and to extract revenue. By 1898, the whole of the Lushai Hills had been 
consolidated into a single Lushai Hill District with its borders clearly marked out. Chiefs were 
forbidden from raiding each other. As in other areas, the state sought to ride piggyback on 
pre-existing authority structures to penetrate society and acquire the legitimacy it needed to 
rule. The strong presence of Sailo chiefs in the hills provided the colonial state with that 
opportunity.40 In doing so the state upheld the authority of the chiefs.41  Chiefs were made 
responsible for tax collection and for maintaining peace within their jurisdiction. The guiding 
principles of the state remained clear: not to interfere in the internal matters of the people and 
their chiefs; to uphold the authority of the chiefs; and to rule through them, while holding 
them responsible for to provide effective administration. The attempt was to impose as few 
(legal) enactments as possible, and to rely on customary codes and practices.42 However, it is 
significant that the colonial state in the Lushai Hills worked in a manner that, while bringing 
the chiefs on board and upholding their authority, helped consolidate its own position at the 
cost of the chiefs’. In this sense the state behaved in ways very different from how it was 
behaving around the same time in Manipur.   
 
First, the state consolidated its hold territorially. While the region was divided into two 
districts immediately after conquest, they were later brought together into a single Lushai 
Hills district, with a Superintendent based in Aizawl as the centre of political and 
administrative authority. Lushai chiefs were an integral part of the administration, being given 
the responsibility for governing their villages. In 1901 the system was strengthened with the 
introduction of the ‘circle system’. The district was divided into sixteen circles, each with an 
interpreter to act as a liaison between the chiefs and the superintendent. In 1906 the first rules 
for the administration of the Lushai Hills were introduced.43 These rules significantly 
constrained the authority that chiefs had traditionally enjoyed, removing many powers they 
had previously enjoyed, such as ordering capital punishment, confiscating property of their 
subjects and taxing traders.44 Chiefs were brought under the supervision of the Superintendent 
of the district, who could regulate and even punish them. The chiefs’ judicial authority was 
also curtailed. While they still sat in judgement over petty cases, appeals against which now 
rested with the Superintendent, criminal cases, especially heinous crimes, were removed from 
the purview of chiefs altogether. Henceforth chiefs would act only as the eyes and ears of the 
Superintendent in matters relating to more serious crimes. Further, in 1927 all customary laws 
                                                
39 For a survey of these see McCall (1949), pp.96-98.   
40 “I have noted with astonishment the blind submission rendered to Lushai rajas by their dependents, and 
considered that this is a factor that cannot be ignored in any future arrangements that may be made for the 
administration of these hills” (Reid, 1942, p.27).  
41 “[U]nless the authority of the chiefs is maintained it will be practically impossible to run the district except at 
a very great expense and with a very much larger staff than at present” (McCall, 1949, p.202).     
42 Reid (1942), p.56. 
43 Rules for the Regulation of the Procedure of Officers Appointed to Administer Justice in the Lushai Hills, 
Government of Assam, 1906.  
44 Chin Hills Regulation, Government of Assam 1896. 
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prevalent in the district were compiled.45 This provided uniformity in the administration of 
justice and thus made the task of the Superintendent’s supervision over the motley tribes 
easier. It also consolidated the incorporation of village chiefs into the administrative set up 
headed by the Superintendent.  
 
Perhaps the strongest measure that undercut the authority of the chiefs was the taking away by 
the colonial state of proprietary rights that chiefs had traditionally enjoyed over land. Under 
the 1901 ‘land settlement’ system introduced in the district, each chief was issued a lease over 
his domain for life. Within the assigned territory, chiefs could move about, as they liked, as 
long as they paid revenue and observed government orders. While ‘settlement’ stabilised 
village boundaries, it implicitly meant that all land belonged to the state. The independence 
that the Lushai chiefs had enjoyed so far was abolished and they were made instruments of 
the colonial state administration. It also meant that chiefs could be removed and also be 
created. The state soon began to issue rights over tracts of land to men it considered useful for 
its purpose.46 Thus in ways very different from how the colonial state behaved in Manipur, in 
Mizoram it consistently worked to incorporate traditional centres of authority within its 
structure, while all the time undermining the latter’s authority. This strengthened the state 
even as it compromised the locus of social forces that could have proved inimical to its 
interests.     
 
Independence saw the Lushai Hills being retained as a part of Assam state, but with special 
features. Constitution makers created a special administrative arrangement for the North East 
region, particularly its tribal areas, as a measure for tribal self-rule. These Autonomous 
District Councils (ADC) were elected bodies and were empowered with substantive 
legislative, executive and judicial authority.47 First elections to the Lushai Hills District 
Council (LHDC) were held in 1948. The Mizo Union, a political party with anti-chief 
sentiments, won a majority of votes. One of the first measures that the MU-dominated Lushai 
ADC took was to pass the Lushai Hills (Abolition of Chief-ship) Regulation, in 1952, 
claiming that the “institution of chief-ship with its unlimited autocratic possibilities is a misfit 
with democracy and as standing in the way of the well-being of the district”.48 In 1954, the 
Government of Assam under pressure from the LHDC acquired the rights of Lushai chiefs.49 
This act was to have a profound effect on the authority structure in the state. It changed 
fundamentally the basis of land and power relations.  
 
If there was any doubt at all who the owner of land was in the Lushai Hills during colonial 
times, the 1954 acquisition of rights of chief-ship removed it all in one quick stroke. While 
the British had asserted the state’s primacy, Lushai chiefs continued to enjoy rights over land 
in perpetuity. This they could sublet to tenants, and by virtue of state protection the chiefs had 
upheld their special privileges and arbitrary rights that came at the expense of the commoners. 
                                                
45 E. Parry, Lushai Custom: A Monograph on Lushai Customs and Ceremonies, Aizawl: Tribal Research 
Institute, 1927. 
46 While at the time of settlement in 1901 there were an estimated 60 chiefs in the Lushai hills, by 1948 there 
were about 400 of them (McCall, 1948, p.245).  
47 The task of devising special administrative arrangements for tribal communities in North East India was given 
to the Sub-Committee for Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas in the Constituent Assembly, otherwise called 
the Bordoloi Sub-Committee. Tribal areas had remained ‘Excluded‘ and ‘Partially Excluded’ in Government of 
India Act of 1935, keeping them outside the ambit of elected state ministries. They had been administered 
directly by the Assam Governor.      
48 LHDC memo to Union Home Minister dated 22-12-1953). Mizoram State Archives File ( Mizoram SA)  # 
135-1 (general).   
49 Assam Lushai Hills District (Acquisition of Chiefs’ Rights) Act 1954. Government of Assam.   
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Abolition of chief-ship in 1952 meant that land became the property of the state and chiefs’ 
privileges no longer existed. Notably, and unlike other land reform regulations in the country, 
chief-ship abolition in Mizoram did not mean that ownership automatically passed on to 
tenants under the former chiefs. All allotments given by the chiefs were also cancelled. 
Tenants had to seek fresh allotments from the LADC.50 The act also led to the burden of 
village administration shifting from chiefs and their councillors to elected Village Councils 
(VC).51 VCs are today responsible for day-to-day village administration. They collect land 
revenue and taxes, distribute jhum (swidden) land and ensure that government regulations are 
complied with.  
 
Chief-ship abolition also led to changes in the legal framework of the state. There are two 
functioning legal systems. One exists under the Autonomous District Council (ADC) and the 
other under the Deputy Commissioner, the executive head of the district.52 The former is a 
three-tier system of courts, at the village, intermediate and ADC level, with jurisdiction over 
minor cases.53 These courts, which use Mizo Hnam Dam (customary code) besides the Indian 
Penal Code (IPC), are open, fast and cheap. A measure of their legitimacy is that not too 
many appeals against their judgement have been made.54 Courts under the Deputy 
Commissioner try cases outside the powers of the ADC courts.55 Despite the dual legal 
system in practice in the state, and the use of customary codes, what is noteworthy here is that 
both legal systems exist within the formal legal framework of the state. They have the state’s 
sanction and are integrated within it. Significantly it is the Guwahati High Court that has 
revisionary jurisdiction over both systems, thus incorporating them fully within a unified 
institutional framework of the state.  
 
The impact of these consolidating moves has been significant. Abolition of chief-ship, 
consolidation of the administrative and legal framework under the state, and bringing tenants 
directly in contact with it, has helped consolidate the state’s authority. This has enhanced the 
state’s social control while weakening drastically any challenges to its authority from social 
forces. The state’s enhanced autonomy enabled Mizoram to be the only hill state in North 
East India to have attempted successful reforms in land ownership and distribution. This has 
led, among other things, to written laws, definition of tenant rights and propriety protection by 
issue of land certificates.56 It also led to regulations promoting equity in land management.57 
As will be seen in the next section, changes in power relations in the Lushai Hills in the early 
years of state formation brought significant political rewards for the commoner-dominated 
Mizo Union party (MU), which won dominant positions in the ADC and State Assembly 
elections in the Lushai Hills for a long time. Together, changes in land relations and electoral 
ascendance of the commoners led to a complete shift in the power structure in the Lushai 
Hills. The Sailos, who had been the dominant factor until 1954, would not re-emerge in 
Mizoram politics until the 1970s.   
                                                
50 For a discussion on the land system of the state see J. N. Das, A Study of the Land System of Mizoram, 
Guwahati: Law Research Institute, 1986.   
51 The Lushai Hills District (Village Council) Act 1953, Government of Mizoram.   
52 In the new post-Independence dispensation, the Deputy Commissioner took the position of the erstwhile 
Superintendent of Lushai Hills.  
53 Established under the Lushai Hills District Council (Administration of Justice) Rules 1953. 
54 H. C. Thanhranga, Administration of Justice in Mizoram, Aizawl: PC Chuauhrangi, 1994, pp.9- 11. 
55 They were established under the Lushai Hills Administration of Justice Rules 1937.  
56 Das (1986), p.219.    
57 Important were Lushai Hills District (House Site) Act 1953, Mizo District (Land Revenue) Act 1956, Mizo 
District (Agricultural Land) Act 1963, Mizo District (Transfer of Land) act 1963 and The Lushai Hills District 
(Revenue Assessment) Regulation 1953  
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So what does the experience with state making in the two cases demonstrate? In Manipur, the 
hill-valley divide in pre-colonial times was exacerbated by colonial policies that encouraged 
institutional bifurcation. Traditional centres of authority managed to retain their 
independence. Post-colonial legislative measures encouraged institutional multiplicity and 
consolidated the hold of traditional centres of power. This came at a cost to the authority of 
the state, which found its autonomy greatly limited. Weakly centralised state structure and 
strong, multiple traditional centres of power underpinned a series of conflicts between state-
making leaders and their traditional counterparts, but also among traditional authorities 
themselves, who were each posing a challenge to the state. The latter mobilised their specific 
identities to garner support and capture power. These dynamics led to an overall diminution 
of state authority, while state power has itself fractured among different social forces, each 
mobilising its own identity.    
 
In Mizoram, the colonial state leveraged Sailo domination of the polity to strengthen its hold 
and consolidate its political power. This process implied a gradual weakening of the political 
authority of the chiefs, with an adverse impact on their social power.  The commoner-
dominated state-making leaders in the state’s formative years consolidated state control by 
undertaking legal, property and administrative reforms. This further undermined the hold of 
traditional centres of power. They invested in, and promoted, centralised and inclusive 
institutions whose control rested with the state. State-making leaders also countered the 
divisive tendencies of traditional centres of authority by constructing an integrated Mizo 
identity. They sought to ground state power in this inclusive identity.  
 
Elite strategies and identity mobilisation   
In this section I explore the particular strategies used by state-making elites to incorporate 
social forces, and the impact the choice of strategy had for politics and inter-community 
relations in the state. I begin by looking at the role of dominant political elites in Manipur in 
mobilising Metei identity to capture power and authority, and also look at how chiefs and 
ethnic associations among tribal/hill communities responded to Metei mobilisation by 
politicising their individual identities. In Mizoram I explore how the chiefs-commoners 
cleavage that had emerged in the years before independence led to the rise of a state-making 
class that found itself in intense struggle for authority with entrenched social forces. I look at 
the opportunities that this class found in the new democratic dispensation and how it devised 
and successfully politicised an inclusive Mizo identity to counter challenges to state-making 
efforts by the chiefs. The vehicle and arena of mobilisation in both cases have been political 
parties and community-based groups. I therefore explore how key political actors and social 
organisations have contributed to the dynamic in the two states, narrow and conflictual in one 
and inclusive and aggregating in the other.  
 
A hundred identities! Competitive mobilisations in Manipur  
In Manipur, state-making leaders used Metei identity to capture power. This was primarily on 
account of the sense of alienation building up against the central administration, which began 
to be seen as ‘foreign’ and imposing. The divide acquired a Metei-foreigner dimension. 
Meteis, being the dominant community and having a long tradition of self-rule, motivated 
state-making leaders to sharpen their Metei identity.  But use of Metei identity to fashion the 
state in its shape also meant that the mobilisation process would exclude other communities in 
the state, all of which had maintained their coherence due to the enduring traditional authority 
structures. They in turn began to mobilise to counter the possibility of a ‘Metei state’. The 
result was cycles of mobilisation and counter-mobilisation, which eventually turned 
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conflictual. This process was led by political parties, but also by social and community 
organisations. We need to look at this process historically.  
 
Political awakening in the valley began with a clutch of small and incipient parties making 
demands on the Maharaja for political rights, in part inspired by the Congress-led 
independence movement in colonial India. The Maharaja sought to respond to this challenge 
by trying to co-opt these voices. He promoted the Nikhil Manipuri Hindu Mahasabha 
(NMHM), a politico-cultural organisation, as a tool for this mobilisation. The new 
intelligentsia of the state, educated in Hindu traditions and practices, formed its core. But the 
Mahraja’s controlled-mobilisation experiment found itself being challenged by radical leaders 
like Hijam Erabot. Though NMHM was made to assume a less sectarian title and agenda, its 
composition remained restrictive.58 In 1946, Nikhil Manipuri Mahasabha (NMM) and other 
minor parties coalesced into the Manipur State Congress, which was to dominate politics in 
the state in the early post merger phase. The composition and outlook of the State Congress 
remained on the whole narrow, there being little representation from tribal hill communities. 
In the Hills, it was the chiefs’ conclaves and ethnic associations that brought political 
awakening. Social exclusion of tribal communities in the early years of the twentieth century 
had led to their welcoming Christian missionaries in their midst. The latter brought education 
and a new worldview.59 In the early years of post-colonial state making, Manipur’s tribal 
communities saw an opportunity to demand political dispensations of their own, separate 
from the valley-led one. They saw demands for tribal states in neighbouring states as 
encouraging signs for their project. Significantly, the Manipur State Constitution enacted by 
the Maharaja in 1948 did attempt to take tribal concerns and their aspirations seriously. It put 
in place a system of representation for tribal communities not only in the elected house but 
also in the cabinet.60 However, the state’s merger in 1949 and its being given a ‘part c’ status 
put an end to that experiment. Over the next decade, a combination of factors led to the rise of 
identity politics as the dominant political trend in Manipur.  
 
By the time of elections to the newly established Advisory Council in 1952, rising political 
aspirations among different groups engendered a number of ethnic political parties. The 
dominant and purportedly secular party – the Manipur State Congress - was itself weak, partly 
due to its derivative character and also on account of the institutional characteristics of the 
party in the Centre.61 The Congress was therefore unable to dominate politics in these 
turbulent days. It was ethnic parties that began to fill the gap, with their narrow and sectarian 
messages. Election results in 1952 demonstrated the strength of identity politics, when 
Congress could win only 10 of the 30 seats. Independent candidates, and those representing 
ethnic parties, won 17. Economic factors played a part in helping to establish the salience of 
ethnic politics. Over a number of decades a Metei middle class had been growing. However, 
their economic aspirations were thwarted by the presence of a large number of non-locals 
holding government jobs and controlling trade and commerce. Lack of access to opportunities 
led this section, made up mostly of educated youth, to politicise their identity and mobilise 
support for a Metei state-building project. The Pan Manipuri Youth League (PMYL), the first 
of such groups in the Valley, emerged in the early 1960s. The state Congress Party’s 
institutional weaknesses were to prove useful to PMYL and the sentiments it represented, 
when a breakaway faction of the Congress formed the Manipur Peoples’ Party (MPP) in 
                                                
58 It was renamed Nikhil Manipur Mahasabha (NMM) and sought to speak for all communities.   
59 Laldena, British Policy towards Manipur 1891-1919, Imphal: Directorate of Welfare of Tribals, Government 
of Manipur, 1984, p.41.  
60 Manipur State Constitution Act 1948. Manipur State Archives.     
61 For detailed discussion on reasons for this weakness, see Chandhoke (2005), p.23. 
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1969. It began demanding ‘Manipur for Manipuris’. In the Hills, it was traditional authorities 
that were behind the formation of ethnic parties. These developments gave a jump-start to 
ethnic politics in the state.    
 
A survey of elections in the early years of Manipur’s political history demonstrates the 
evolving crisis. Political parties frequently employed ethnic appeals to mobilise their 
constituencies. MPP and other parties raised the issues of maintaining integrity of the state’s 
borders, advancement of the Manipuri language and script and allowing Meteis to acquire 
property in the hills. Naga Integration Committee, a hill-based party, demanded integration of 
all Naga areas of Manipur with Nagaland state.62 State election results show how these 
messages were connecting with the electorate (see Table 1).63  
 
Table 1: (Party-wise position in state assembly, Manipur)   
 Total 
seats  
Congress  Other 
National 
Regional  Ethnic  Independent  
1967 30 16 5 - - 9 
1972 60 17 9 15 - 19 
1974 60 13 8 20 14 5 
1980 60 13 22 4 2 19 
1984 60 30 5 3 1 21 
1990 60 24 18 9 3 - 
1995 60 22 12 21 2 3 
2000 60 11 14 34 - 1 
2002 60 20 12 28 - - 
Source: Election Commission of India ( http://www.eci.gov.in/ElectionResults/)  
 
 
While the Congress party has mostly been the dominant one in the state assembly and has 
formed the government on most occasions, the most interesting aspect about elections results 
in Manipur has been the fragmented mandate given to political leaders by the people and the 
presence of ‘independent candidates’ and those representing parties with narrow 
constituencies. Independent’ candidates have been a big force, especially in the 1970s and 
1980s. They have been prime targets for parties seeking to form the government, but which 
lacked a clear majority. Many of these candidates came from hill constituencies, though the 
valley too had its fair share. Independent candidates perhaps represent local/community 
interests or those unmediated by state-wide political parties. This is confirmed by the shift, 
from the 1990s, in the number of independent candidates in the state assembly with a parallel 
increase in the position of regional and ethnic parties. Kuki National Assembly (KNA), 
Manipur Hills Union (MHU) and Naga National Party (NNP), all hill-based organisations, 
have had some modest successes in mobilizing their constituencies, limited on account of the 
small size of constituencies they catered to. On the other hand it was the the Manipur Peoples’ 
Party (MPP) in the 1990s followed by the Manipur State Congress Party (MSCP) that gained 
advantages at the cost of national parties. While these parties sought to appeal to all 
constituencies, and even managed a small presence in the hills, their outlook was essentially 
valley-based. All these tendencies fed into government instability and social conflicts.64 
                                                
62 Party manifestos, Indian National Congress (INC), MPP, Ireipok Lasihem quoted in R P Singh, Electoral 
Politics in Manipur, New Delhi: Concept Publishing, 1981.  
63 From 1952 to 1967, elections were held for the state Territorial Council. In 1972, a Manipur Assembly was set 
up with 60 members. 
64 Since 1972, when Manipur became a state, there have been 18 changes of government. 1990s, the decade with 
the worst ethnic violence in the state – Naga-Kuki, Metei-Muslim and Kuki-Paite clashes – witnessed  frequent 
change of the party in power.      
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The increasing politicisation of ethnicity in the state has been reflected in the policies and 
agenda of all political parties. Today they all incorporate agendas and promises that are 
identity-based in nature.65   
 
Mobilisation of identity by political parties has been paralleled by the growth of, and 
increasing space occupied by, ethnic associations and community groups. Student and 
women’s groups as well as tribal organisations have been particularly active here. Meira 
Paibi, a Metei women’s network, has a long tradition of activism going back to early 
twentieth century colonial times. Similar women’s groups are active in the hills. Youth and 
student organisations like the All Manipur Students’ Union (AMSU), All Naga Students’ 
Association Manipur (ANSAM), All Tribal Students Union Manipur (ATSUM) and the Zomi 
Student’s Federation (ZSF), as well as the Kuki Students’ Organisation (KSO), play a leading 
role in campaigning for their community’s political demands. Tribal associations such as the 
Tangkhul Naga Long (TKL), Zeliangrong Union (ZU), Kuki Inpi Manipur (KIM) and Paite 
National Congress (PNC) even enjoy legal authority among their communities. The authority 
these organisations occupy is an outcome of the state’s inability to incorporate these social 
forces in its state structure, thus leaving them with a large social role within their 
communities.  
 
Particularistic organisations have gained the upper hand in social control at the cost of state 
organisations, something they have retained to this day.  Today many ‘parallel authorities’, 
reflecting these non-state forces, have risen to take up issues of public concerns. These 
organisations pose a serious threat to the authority of state  organisations and institutions. 
They seek to police social life, administer rough and ready justice, provide a sense of security 
to their ethnic group, and act as watchdogs against corrupt politicians and officials and voice 
protest over violations of human rights by government forces.66 Populist actions by these 
groups and poor capacity of state agencies have led to large sections of people actively 
seeking intervention of these ‘parallel authorities’ for solutions to their problems. Vernacular 
dailies often carry ‘appeals’ to ‘concerned authorities’ to look into public issues, arbitration of 
personal disputes and dispensation of justice. The multiplicity of ‘authorities’, and the 
alliances that political parties have forged with them, facilitates conflicting mobilisation. This 
is mostly to capture resources and benefits controlled by the state. The state’s own 
weaknesses and its poor claim over authority have prevented its power from being fully 
grounded. As will be seen in the next section, its own actions have contributed to the cycle of 
mobilisation and counter-mobilisation.   
 
Reinventing the ‘Mizo’: Inclusive mobilisation in the Lushia Hills     
In Mizoram, we have shown how events in the post-colonial phase of state making 
consolidated the power of the state. Along with the gradual diminution of the authority of the 
chiefs in the Lushai hills, the commoners rose as a powerful social and political force. This 
was an outcome of the unique history of the state. Christian missionaries had brought into the 
Lushai Hills not only their faith, but also education.  But missionaries were not very welcome 
                                                
65 The Congress party won the 2002 Assembly elections promising to protect the territorial integrity of the state 
(Congress Manifesto, 2002 Elections). The Federal Party of Manipur, the principal opposition in the current 
Assembly, in a similar appeal to identity sentiments, promised ‘to secure for this united ancient state, a rightful 
and dignified place in the Republic of India’  (The Federal Agenda: 2002, Federal Party of Manipur, Imphal)   
66 For instance the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup  (KYKL), an armed militant organisation, and student bodies such 
as All Manipur Students’ Union (AMSU) and Manipur Students’ Federation (MSF) have ostensibly tried to rid 
the education system of its ills.  They have often used the threat of violence to meet their objectives (‘Bullet in 
leg over cheating’, The Telegraph (Kolkatta), 26 November 2004.    
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in the eyes of the chiefs who were upholders of tradition. Missionaries were popular with the 
commoners, however, who saw salvation in the new opportunities that the former were 
providing. The commoners readily took to modern education, a commodity that was soon to 
become a passport to jobs and opportunities. It was the commoners who were best positioned 
to take advantage of this opportunity.67 The chiefs - commoners cleavage also had an ethnic 
aspect to it. Chiefs were Lushais, mostly of the Sailo clan, while the commoners were non-
Lushai. Led by Hmars and Raltes, they also included Kuki, Paite and Simte clans. Hmars 
were mostly in trade and commerce and in salaried government employment, while Raltes 
made up the bulk of the church bureaucracy, a formidable force in the then Lushai hills. 
Commoners also enjoyed wider support in and outside the Lushai Hills, something that was to 
prove useful for identity mobilisation in the post-colonial democratic dispensation.  
 
Improvement in social and economic status and a realisation of their advantages in the new 
democratic dispensation led to commoners demanding a place for themselves in the political 
future of the state. They opposed moves by the departing colonial state to uphold the chiefs’ 
dominance over the political future of the Lushai Hills. The following moves of the 
commoners’ leadership are not very clear. But based on documentary evidence and interviews 
with leaders still alive, one can piece together the sequence of events that led them to 
‘reinvent’ the Mizo identity as a way to contest the chiefs’ monopoly. In 1946, non-Lushai 
leaders came together to form the Mizo Commoners’ Union (MCU). The significance of the 
name was important. Rather than Hmar or Ralte, they used the title Mizo. Amongst the Kukis-
Chin family, ‘Mizo’ has long signified the general population of the hills, being derived from 
the phrase ‘mi-zo’, meaning ‘man of the hills’, and was meant to have little ethnic 
significance.68 This was against the official designation of the people living in these hills as 
Lushais, an ethnic category. Hence technically, there were a lot more people living in the 
Lushai Hills who were categorised as Lushai but who were not so ethnically. The MCU’s 
choice of ‘Mizo’, a neutral non-ethnic appellation, was instantly acceptable to those who did 
not wish to belong to the Lushai category.69 Using ‘Mizo’ also helped to forge commonness 
among non-Lushai elements and scale-up the MCU’s support base, something that was 
important for the organisation, as Hmar or Raltes categories themselves would have been too 
weak to contest Lushai monopoly.70 
 
But the leaders of the MCU went beyond just providing a forum for anti-Lushai activity. To 
secure political leadership of the Lushai hills, the party underlined the inclusiveness of the 
Mizo identity. In 1947 MCU renamed itself Mizo Union (MU), thereby claiming to speak for 
                                                
67 For a survey of these dynamics see McCall (1949), pp.203-207. 
68 J. Shakespeare, The Lushai Kuki Clans, London: Macmillan & Co., 1912, p.xiv.   
69 In the 1951 census, for example, many Raltes and Renthlai, though they spoke the Lushai duhlian dialect 
refused to enter themselves as Lushai. B. B. Goswami, The Mizo Unrest: A Study of Politicization of Culture, 
Jaipur: Alakh, 1979, p.23. 
70 This was actually a case of reinventing, but to give the name a different meaning so as to serve a particular 
purpose. It was not as if ‘Mizo’ was a totally new name. Tribes inhabiting the region have been know by 
different names to outsiders: in pre-colonial times, they were all called ‘Kuki’, a Bengali word for hillman. On 
British advent (first contacts began with confrontation with and eventual subjugation of the dominant Sailo 
chiefs, who belonged to the Lusei clan), the name Lushai (a derivative of the word Lusei) began to be used. This 
gained currency after the area was organized administratively as the Lushai Hills district. However, another 
name that was also occasionally used was Mizo. Some colonial accounts felt Lushais call themselves Mizao / 
Mizau (McCabe in Foreign Department, External Part A Prog. Dec 1892, no 43.) This was akin to the word ‘Zo’ 
often mispronounced as ‘Yo’, by which people have been known to refer to themselves (GA Grierson, Linguistic 
Survey of India, Vol. III Pt. III: 2). Yet in 1930 there were as many as 15 categories under which the population 
of the district was being listed; Lushai, Poi, Lakher, Hmar, Ralte, Renthlai, Khinagte, Thadou, et al, but not 
Mizo. (Military Report of 1930 (Vol III:201) quoted in BB Goswami 1978 : 22). 
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all Mizos, not only commoners.71 Among its renewed objectives were to “unify and integrate 
all Mizo people”, “to normalise relations between chiefs and the commoners”, “to act as a 
representative of the Mizo people” and “to popularise the Mizo language”.72 To enhance its 
social base, the party’s constitution listed 41 sub-tribes as those belonging to the Mizo 
category. Many belong to areas outside the Lushai hills, in Manipur, Tripura, Chittagong Hill 
Tracts and Burma.  
 
Table 2:  Tribe/Language populations  
Tribe /Year   1901 1951    1961 
Hmar 10,411 -    3,118 
Lai/Pawi 15,038 8,548    4,587 
Lushai  36,322 159,297 - 
Mara/Lakher  Na 6,350     8,790 
Mizo - - 213,061 
Paite    2,870 3,468 - 
Ralte  13,827 - - 
Source:Rev Liangkhia (1947): Mizo Chanchin –II, Aizawl : 20; B Poonte (1965): Zoram Thlirna, Aizawl: 20; 
Goswami (1979): 18, quoted in Central YMA (1988): Our Land and Identity. CYMA No 29, 40-41 Aizawl and 
Census of India 1951, Language Tables for Assam.   
 
Interestingly, at the core of the Mizo construct was the Duhlian language, a dialect that 
belonged to Sailo chiefs. Probably what motivated the leadership to use a Lushai symbol in an 
attempt to contest Lushai power was the place of Duhlian in the lives of people. It was this 
language that was the common thread between people from disparate cultural backgrounds 
who inhabited the Lushai hills, and even beyond. Re-emphasising their commonness was 
central to the MCU’s attempt to forge a common identity. One of the first tasks the MU-
dominated LHDC took up was renaming the Lushai hills as Mizo Hills.73 Earlier, in 1951, the 
Census Commission under the MU’s influence had recognised Mizo as a tribal category in 
Assam, facilitating the MU’s drive to consolidate the Mizo identity. By 1961 the Mizo 
identity was a fait accompli. 
 
These were moves that would prove useful for the MU in its bid for power in the new post-
Independence democratic set-up. With its broad political appeal and a large commoners’ 
constituency, the party was the overall gainer in the political contests. In the first elections 
held in the district in 1947, the MU won all but two seats to the Advisory Council. In 1952, it 
swept the polls to the Assam State Assembly, winning all three seats from the district. It also 
swept the polls to the newly constituted Lushai Hills District Council (LHDC) and the village 
councils. It would continue to do so to varying degrees in the elections to follow: 13 out of 22 
seats in 1957, 16 out of 22 in 1962 and 9 out of 22 in 1970.74 Elections to VCs since 1952 
have invariably seen the election of people who traditionally belonged to non-Lushai sections. 
The MU and its non-Lushai constituency also reaped dividends at the local level with the 
party dominating a majority of village councils in the 1950s and 60s. The MU won a majority 
in all 381 village councils in 1952 and 1957, in 280 out of 381 councils in 1960, 228 out of 
                                                
71 This discussion is based on secondary sources and interviews with R. Vanlawma, founder member of MCU 
and MU (Aizawl, 11 July 2004).  
72 Mizo Union Constitution, Mizoram SA.  
73 The Lushai Federation opposed the act, claiming that the district had been the land of the Lushais, and that 
“they resented being subdued by some other tribes living amongst them”, who had “cunningly introduced the 
word ‘Mizo’, which had no distinctive existence” (Mizoram SA # 95-66 (General)). 
74 Mizoram SA # 106-37 (General) and 196-7 (General).    
 20
411 in 1963 and in 66 out of 158 councils in 1971.75 Successive political parties have played 
up this integrative message, and have reaped its political gains. Regional parties emphasizing 
their Mizo credentials have on the whole performed better at the polls than national parties.  
 
Table 3: Party performances in elections (post-1986)   
Party/year  ‘87 ‘89 ‘93 ‘98 ‘03 
MNF - 14 14 21 21 
Congress  13 23 16 6 12 
PC 3 1 - - - 
Other - - - 12 7 
Independent  24 2 10 1 - 
Total  40 40 40 40 40 
Source: Chief Electoral Officer, Mizoram  
(MNF: Mizo National Front, PC: People’s Conference, Others: Parties such as Zomi National Party–ZNP)  
 
This meant a near-total break with the past. The shift changed the power structure in the 
Lushai Hills, leading to the rise of the hitherto disadvantaged sections as the dominant 
element in modern Mizoram. But by keeping the doors to the Mizo identity open to all 
sections, state-making leaders were able to broaden their social base and appeal by letting 
traditional elites in as well, to participate in Mizo social engineering. Much of the Mizo 
success with stability has been an outcome of this mechanism. It has also meant the 
incorporation of the social forces in the state’s ruling structure, thus grounding state power 
firmly in ‘Mizo’ society, with the vehicle for this consolidation being a united Mizo identity. 
Social organisations have helped state-making leaders and dominant political parties in this 
task, by helping to consolidate the state-society compact and provide stability.   
 
The role of the Presbyterian Church and Young Mizo Association (YMA), a quasi-church 
youth organisation, is significant here. As in other parts of North East region, Christian 
missionaries were brought into the Lushai Hills by the colonial state to help with social 
change and as an adjunct to colonial objectives. But unlike elsewhere, colonial administrators 
in the Lushai Hills depended to a greater extent on the energies of mission workers for a 
variety of tasks, most notably to educate its people. Missionaries ended up playing a defining 
role in the social life of the people and in the making of Lushai society. 76 The Lushai 
churches’ principal vehicle for social change is the YMA, established to uphold 
tlawngmainai, or the code of social discipline. YMA was envisioned as a substitute for 
zualbawks, the erstwhile institution of youth dormitories that had helped Lushai chiefs 
maintain social control and stability in their village.77  
 
Key areas of focus for the YMA and churches have been preserving the common Mizo 
identity and upholding order.78 The YMA has focused on promoting “the best in Mizo 
culture”. In recent times, it has sought to do this through “re-emphasising Christianity, sowing 
seeds of nationalism, searching out and preserving (Mizo) territory and having good political 
                                                
75 Mizoram SA # 157-12 (general) as well as personal records of Bonthanga Poonte, ex-state social welfare 
officer, quoted in C. Nunthara, Mizoram: Society and Polity, New Delhi: Indus, 1996, p.77. 
76 McCall (1949), pp.207-212.  
77 McCall, one of the last colonial administrators in the district, was one of those who felt Christian missionaries 
had worked to compromise the hold of Lushai chiefs and their traditions. According to him, “the changes they 
(missions) have wrought, have been spectacular, ...necessarily involving attack after attack on tradition” and that 
had given “a final blow to the authority of chiefs in Lushai society.” (McCall, 1949:199). 
78 Lalruatkima, ‘Preserving National Identity’, YMA General Conference, Khawzawl, 2002, (Vawi 57-na); and 
Lal Chungnuna, ‘Self Reliance’, Central YMA General Conference, Thenzawl, 2003 (Vawi 58 – NA).    
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leaders”.79 Its close relationship with the state is underlined by the fact that the constitution of 
the YMA declares, “government is our government”. Government departments have closely 
involved the YMA in implementation of their development programmes.80 For its part, the 
dominant Presbyterian Church has been actively seeking to promote order in society and 
encourage ‘ethical politics’. It regularly issues directions to candidates and to voters for 
peaceful conduct of elections.81 It also organises political education seminars and political 
awareness campaigns besides the usual clutch of social interventions.82   
 
The Presbyterian Church and the YMA are key institutions of Mizo society. Their 
organisational strength and reach make them powerful instruments of social control. Both are 
structured as centralised bureaucracies. 98% of the state’s population is Christian. The 
Presbyterian Church, the dominant one in the state, has an apex Synod controlling individual 
churches down to the village level in a tightly organised network. The YMA network is 
equally extensive and organised. The Central YMA (CYMA) that sits at the apex in Aizawl 
tightly controls around seven hundred branches in Mizoram and beyond, organised at village 
and regional levels.83 The YMA claims that every Mizo youth in the state and outside is a 
member of the organisation. In effect each member of the Mizo community is bound into the 
Church-YMA framework. The organisational strengths of these bodies also means they have 
sizeable budgets, financed by individual and public contributions.  
 
Table 4: Annual Budget of key Social Organisations (Rs. ‘000)  
 2002-2003 2003-2004 
Presbyterian Synod  353,786 386,682 
Central YMA    9,207     9,501 
Source:    Mizoram Presbyterian Synod Annual Reports   
              Central YMA Annual Reports  
 
The centralised nature of these organisations, and their large budgets, means they are able to 
manage their entire organisation right down to the individual village level and demand 
compliance with their programmes and directions. Adding to integrative capacity of these 
social organisations is cross-membership among them as well as that with agencies of the 
state.84 The president of the Central YMA, Lianzala, is a middle-level civil servant in the state 
government’s health department. Similarly the administrative head of the department tasked 
with essential supplies, is also the head of the local branch of the YMA besides being a senior 
member of the Church. In fact a majority of the YMA’s key office bearers are government 
employees. Most of them also happen to be senior church members. Since the churches and 
the YMA between them make up the core of civil society in Mizoram, this bonding helps pre-
empt many state-society conflicts.85 It is no wonder that the issues the YMA and Church have 
                                                
79 Central YMA General conference, Khawzawl, 22-24 October 2002, (Vawi 57-na). 
80 Recent partnerships have been in provision of essential services and in implementation of development 
projects. Central YMA is a key actor in state government’s Intodelha (self-sufficiency) Project launched in the 
90s, and in its recently started land allotment programme to the poor. Newslink, Aizawl, May 23, 2003. 
81 Synod Executive Committee meeting with new MLAs of the Assembly (17-2-1994); Mizoram Synod Social 
Front Occasional Bulletin # 2. March 1994 
82 Synod Bu (Annual Report), Vawi 76-na (2000), 77-na (2001), 78-na (2002). Aizawl: Mizoram Presbyterian 
Synod.    
83 YMA Report 2004.  Aizawl: Central YMA. 
84 This could perhaps be the result of colonial state-missionaries alliances in education and other social fields 
(McCall (1949), pp.203-205). 
85 Interview, Thanhawla, Secretary to the Government of Mizoram (Aizawl, 2 July 2004).      
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usually emphasised are peace and order; unity and a common Mizo identity; good ‘Christian 
behaviour’; and social and political responsibility.  
 
State-society relations in Mizoram are thus significantly different from those in Manipur. 
Firstly, state-making leaders politicised the common Mizo identity to thwart challenges from 
traditional and particularistic centres of authority. Mizo identity was so packaged as to include 
all elements of Mizo society, including those that challenged the construct. Construction of 
the Mizo ethnic category and its politicisation was thus central to the state-making exercise. 
Political advantages associated with this social engineering helped institutionalise the Mizo 
construct. Contributing to this integrative process was the history of patterns of close 
relationships between the state and the principal social organisations in the Lushai Hills. In 
more recent times, the state has leveraged the strengths of these social organisations to re-
emphasise the inclusive Mizoness of society and uphold order and stability in the state.         
 
State Autonomy and Capacity  
What has been the overall impact of state-society dynamics on contemporary politics in 
Manipur and Mizoram? How have divergent modes of politicisation of identity in the two 
states had an impact on the respective state’s ability to govern and to respond to community 
demands? How has it affected their capacity to manage community conflicts? And crucially, 
how have the particular historical experiences of the two states with identity mobilisation 
affected inter-community relations among them? It is these questions that I address in this 
final section to understand the conditions that create violence in one and enable relative peace 
in another. I begin by exploring whether, and to what extent, the state in Manipur is accessible 
to its minority communities. As tests for accessibility I take access to public office, the state’s 
allocation and transfer of resources and its readiness to share power with minority 
communities. I then explore how minorities have responded to their poor accessibility to the 
state (or otherwise) and the impact this has had on politics in the state. I conduct a similar test 
for Mizoram, exploring what aids minorities’ access to resources and power, and the 
implications of this accessibility for social cohesion and state legitimacy.       
 
Manipur’s ‘limited’ state   
Metei mobilisation by the state’s dominant state-making leaders has had consequences for the 
large non-Metei population. They have complained about state institutions being partisan. 
Tribal organisations believe they have been excluded and that the state government has not 
been fair in distribution of resources to their areas. The poor condition of educational and 
health services, adverse economic conditions and poor infrastructure in these areas have often 
been the source of tribal complaints and their consequent anti-state mobilisation. Often these 
complaints have resonated with findings of the government itself.86 Tribal communities in 
Manipur have often complained of their poor representation in state government jobs and of 
the paucity of personnel and poor functioning of public offices in the hills. While it is 
mandatory to have at least 31 per cent tribal employees in all government departments,87 few 
departments have been able to meet this target, sometimes due to a shortage of adequately 
qualified candidates, but mostly on account of a lack of political and bureaucratic 
                                                
86 Statistical Tables of Manipur: Department of Economics and Statistics, Government of Manipur, 2004.  
87 This is against the all-India reservation of 7.5%, based on proportionate composition of  ‘tribal’ communities 
at the national level. According to the 1971 census, tribal communities make up 31% of Manipur’s population. 
See Manipur SA # G-FA/12/54, R/18-5, 352 on this debate in the Parliament.  
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commitment.88 There is also a very skewed manning of government offices between the hills 
and the valley districts. Tribal groups have often complained of abundance of staff in Imphal 
and other valley districts, while government establishments in hill districts are perpetually 
short of them.89  
 
Aggravating the situation is the perception among tribal communities of poor investment in 
hill areas, poor implementation of development programmes and absence of basic 
infrastructure. The Hills make up some 9/10ths of the total area of the state. Tribal 
communities, who exclusively inhabit them, constitute 37 per cent of the state’s total 
population. A survey of budget allocations for hill districts in fiscal 2004-05 throws up some 
interesting figures: only 26 per cent of the total budget of the Education Department was 
allocated for the five hill districts. It wasn’t any better in other departments: 25 per cent of the 
Health department’s budget and 22 per cent of the budget of the Public Works Department’s  
(PWD), the agency responsible for roads and other works. In the other key departments of 
social welfare and agriculture, the allocation was 14 per cent and 12 per cent respectively.90 A 
similar imbalance characterizes credit to the Hills as a proportion of total credit to the state: 
21.4 per cent in 2003 and only 7.8 per cent in 2002.91 The outcome of low levels of 
investment in the Hills has been along predictable lines. Four out of five hill districts figure at 
the bottom of the heap on the human development index.92 These districts also have a larger 
proportion of the poor than their valley counterparts.93   
 
Tribal organisations see most of these problems arising out of the state government’s 
concentrating political powers in Metei hands and their reluctance to share power with other 
communities. Although administrative powers have been devolved to local bodies in valley 
districts, complaints have been voiced about how there has been a gradual disempowerment 
of elected local bodies in the hills. Elections to local bodies in valley districts have been 
conducted regularly, while their charter of administrative authority and their resource base has 
been expanded.94 There has been little of that in the hills. Elections to ADCs set up in 1973, 
under the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Council Act 1971, have not been held since 1990.95 
The state government has since directly controlled them. Village Authorities, set up under 
provisions of Manipur Village Authorities (in the Hill Areas) Act 1956, have similarly 
remained a damp squib. Set up on the lines of traditional village councils, they have little 
powers to implement development projects and are generally sidelined by the bureaucratic 
machinery. Elections to them have been irregular and they have mostly been captured by 
                                                
88 In a Public Interest Litigation filed in Guwahati High Court by H. Nengsong, on behalf of Manipur Tribal 
Employees Association (MTEA), it was claimed there were only 20.3% Scheduled Tribes (STs) in the Medical 
department, 8.5% in Education, 21.8% in Police and 16% in the Manipur Secretariat. 
89 Memorandum submitted by Movement for Tribal People’s Rights, Manipur (MTPRM) to state Chief Minister,  
Imphal, 1 March 2003. 
90 Finance Department, Government of Manipur, 2004.   
91 Minutes of the State Level Bankers’ Coordination Committee Meetings, Union Bank of India, Manipur 
Regional Office, Imphal: Various issues.   
92  Department of Economics and Statistics, Government of Manipur, Human Development Series 2003.       
93 19.33 % in Imphal, 26.24 % in Bishnupur and 24.39 % in Thoubal, all valley districts. For the hills: 40 % in 
Churachandpur, 44.4 % in Ukhrul, 42 % in Chandel, 51.3 % in Senapati and 54.5 % in Tamenglong (Estimates 
of the Proportion of Poor in Manipur: NSS 55th Round, 1999-2000). 
94 ‘Cabinet Clears Devolution of Powers to Panchayati Raj’, The Imphal Free Press, 20 September         2005. 
95 ADCs in Manipur were established under the 5th Schedule of the constitution, unlike those in Mizoram (and 
other Northeast states) under the 6th Schedule. While the latter have extensive legislative, executive and judicial 
powers and secure sources of finance, 5th Schedule ADCs have little autonomy. Manipur’s tribal leaders have 
been demanding conversion of their ADCs to 6th Schedule status and have, since 1990, been boycotting ADC 
elections to press their demands.     
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powerful local elites. Governance in the hills has in effect, seen a movement towards greater 
disempowerment. It has reverted to direct administration under state bureaucracy. Line 
departments, which so far have worked through their district offices, are increasingly 
becoming centralised with almost all development schemes being formulated and 
implemented from the state capital. Inadequate access to jobs, poor functioning of state 
institutions in the hills and reluctance of the state to share power with local communities in 
hill districts have fed into mounting tribal alienation. Moved by their apparent neglect, tribal 
leaders and organisations have frequently resorted to protests and strikes.  
 
The state government’s response to these grievances has been less than robust. It has mostly 
dithered, tried to buy time and sought short-term compromises. Much of this inertia could be 
the result of pressures on the state from Metei civil society groups. Metei associations have 
been vocal in opposing tribal demands. Citing existing legislation that benefits tribal 
communities, these associations question the need for additional safeguards. Metei groups 
have been resentful of reservations for tribal communities in jobs within the central public 
sector, claiming that opportunities for educated Metei youth are limited. They have also 
demanded that existing land laws in the state under the MLR&LR Act 1960 be extended to 
Hills areas, to relieve some of the pressure on land in the Valley. They argue that while there 
are large tracts of unutilised land in Hill districts, cultivable land in the Valley is scarce.96 
Metei groups have also opposed tribal demands for conversion of ADCs to 6th Schedule 
status, citing dangers to Manipur’s ‘territorial integrity’ due to possible creation of ‘states 
within state’.97 Mainstream political leaders have tended to go along with these 
interpretations, reaffirming Metei fears.98 The state’s perceived inaction on tribal grievances 
and Metei civil society’s opposition to their demands have led to tribal alienation. Of late, 
tribal organisations have increasingly begun raising demands for division of the state and 
separate administrative units for themselves. With rising socio-economic challenges, the cycle 
of conflicts has become unending.  
    
A telling consequence of the playing-out of contests has been the highly conflictual nature of 
politics in Manipur. Politics in the state have moved to the streets. Strikes, bandhs (public 
closures), road blockades and protests by citizen’s groups are common. There were 34 bandhs 
in 2001 and 38 in 2002, leading to an average of two months of working days lost each year 
on account of them.99  The state’s poor autonomy means it is constantly hemmed in by social 
forces each pursuing its limited interests.  Frustration with the state’s inability to govern is so 
pronounced that a local paper noting “There is no indication of any rule of law in the state” 
and that “nobody respects the law”, was forced to ask, “who exactly is running the state?”100 
Paralysis of the state, its weakness and poor authority, have undermined the state’s role as the 
framework for resolving inter-community conflicts. With little direction from the state, public 
organisations have had a field day, mobilising support along particularistic lines. These have 
                                                
96 Both measures stem from constitutional provisions that seek to neutralise structural disadvantages faced by 
tribal communities in the country. The first seeks to provide tribals access to public employment, while the 
second aims to prevent alienation of tribal land to outsiders. Yet the fact of restricted opportunities for non-tribal 
youth in the state and rising pressure on Valley land is indisputable.         
97 Sangai Express (Imphal), 31 October 2002.   
98 R. K. Ranbir, Ex-Chief Minister, recently warned of loss of territorial integrity of the state if 6th schedule 
demand was conceded (The Imphal Free Press, 2 November 2002). 
99 According to the state Finance Department, losses due to bandhs in a single year amount to about Rs 32.18 
billion in a year, more than double the annual Plan resource that Manipur receives from the Centre.  While 
bandhs do not much affect the salaried class, labourers, daily wage earners and those engaged in the farming 
sector are hit hard (Sangai Express (Imphal), 29 September 2005). 
100 ‘No Difference’, Editorial The Imphal Free Press, 24 June 1998.    
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spawned sustained and multiplying conflicts. Inter-community mobilisation in this situation 
tends to quickly degenerate into violence. The enduring picture is one of a weak state, with 
little autonomy, hemmed in by powerful social forces. The state’s actions feed into patterns of 
mobilisation and counter-mobilisation in the political arena. With the state controlling most 
resources, contestations for a share of these continues incessantly, leading to frequent 
breakdown.     
 
Accommodation in Mizoram  
State-making leaders in Mizoram ensured that mobilisation around Mizo identity was 
inclusive. This, and the need to maintain the Mizo edifice, ensures that the state is sensitive to 
minority concerns and takes them on board. Different social groups within the Mizo 
constellation have better representation in the agencies of the state government. Hmars and 
Raltes, due to their advancement in education and commerce and Lushais due to their political 
power are evenly represented in state government structures. It is true that minority 
communities such as Maras and Lai, as well as Chakmas, do not find proportionate 
representation in state bureaucracy.101 Yet the presence of separate ADCs for these 
communities, under 6th Schedule provisions, ensures they get a relatively fair share of 
resources and political power.102 Chakma ADC employs 996 persons, all Chakmas; Lai ADC, 
1648 persons; and Mara ADC, 1580 persons of their particular group, an average of 3% of 
each community’s population.103 Mizoram is also one of the few states in the region where 
minority communities effectively control resources and their way of life. Among other things, 
elected ADCs have significant control over how land, forests and other natural resources in 
their jurisdiction are utilised, what laws are followed to order social life and what language is 
used in local schools.  
 
Undoubtedly, ADCs in Mizoram came about not due to any proactive policies of state 
government but because of central interventions. Yet the fact that the three have been 
functioning, and have the full support of the state government, speaks of the government’s 
attitude.104 It will be fruitful here to examine the state’s response to political demands by 
sections of Hmar and Bru communities. The Singlung Hills Development Council (SHDC), 
an outcome of negotiations between the rebel Hmar People’s Convention (HPC) and the state 
government, tries to replicate the ADC example for the Hmar community, albeit on a less 
grand scale. While SHDC may have its weak spots (fund transfers are not statutory, there is 
little in the scheme for control over land and resources as well over cultural aspects of the 
Hmar community), its very presence, and the readiness of the state government to think in 
terms of autonomy for those with grievances, has helped moderate their sense of being 
wronged.105 The Mizoram government’s agreeing to a similar arrangement for Bru group 
recently was the basis for the Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF) agreeing to give up their 
violent activities.106 Significantly, in both instances, it was not the central government that 
                                                
101 Making up a poor 0.7% of Mizoram State Secretariat’s strength (Memorandum of the United Lai Chakma 
Mara Union Territory (ULCM UT) Demand Committee to the Prime Minister, 2000, p.9). 
102 This is despite the alleged poor representation of minority communities in state government services. (ULCM 
UT Demand Committee memo to the PM, 2000).  
103 State government with total staff strength of 42,883 employs some 4.5 % of the population.    
104 There have been calls by Mizo public organisations and sometimes by political parties, for the abolition of 
Chakma ADC. Mizos believe the Assam government foisted it on them, without there being a case for it. Yet all 
political parties have, from time to time, forged political alliances with Chakma leaders and have facilitated 
Chakma ADC’s functioning. No such calls have been made for Mara and Lai ADCs. 
105 Memorandum of Settlement between Government of Mizoram and HPC, Aizawl (27 July 1994).  
106 BNLF and Mizoram Government signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 26 April 2005, South Asia 
Intelligence Review, 3:42 (2 May 2005).  
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was leading talks with militants, but the state government. ADCs and the SHDC have ensured 
that development investment in minority areas is less iniquitous. ADCs act as channels for 
much of the developmental interventions of the state in remote pockets inhabited by minority 
tribes. Statutory transfers from the state to the ADCs means that these regions, and more 
importantly the elite tied to them, get substantial resources over which they have direct 
control.  
 
Table 5    Transfers to ADCs in Mizoram  
ADC Population 
(2001) 













in million Rs. 
Lai    51,878   83     290.5      393.3            706.0 
Mara    50,188   60     249.8      343.2          635.5 
Chakma    32,807   69     172.4      244.7          335.3 
Source: Draft 10th 5-year plan (2002-2007), Government of Mizoram and Mizoram Government’s Memorandum 
to Tenth Finance Commission, Feb 2004.)   
 
Representation of different communities, including minorities, in the administrative and 
political structures of the state, and with the state enabling minorities to exercise control over 
local resources and their way of life, has helped bind elites from minority communities in 
patterns of mutual relationships with the state structure. Political parties have contributed to 
this process. The Congress party, when it was in power in the 1990s, and the ruling Mizo 
National Front in more recent times, have often forged political alliances with elites from 
minority communities. This has been a win-win exercise. While this has helped bring 
minority viewpoints onto the state agenda, mainstream Mizo parties have managed to obtain a 
toehold in minority constituencies. Congress in Mizoram has traditionally enjoyed a special 
place among Chakmas and Maras, and has consistently opposed demands for dissolution of 
these ADCs.107 The MNF, which on many occasions was the party moving the resolutions for 
dissolution of Chakma ADC, recently welcomed a large number of Chakma leaders into its 
fold.108 It has slowly been making inroads in Chakma ADC and now heads the coalition in 
power there. Until recently, the MNF had an alliance with the lone Mara Democratic Front 
(MDF) representative in the state assembly, a move that helped the party safeguard its 
majority in the state assembly. In the past, MNF had established a political alliance with HPC 
promising to support Hmar autonomy demands in return for electoral support.109 The recent 
break-through in Mizo-Bru talks is also being seen as an outcome of similar political deals 
between the ruling-Mizo National Front (MNF) and the Bru leaders.110 Elite alliances have 
worked to help integrate minorities into the Mizo body politic.   
 
Perhaps what motivates political parties to be accommodative is the overpowering legacy of 
the Mizo Union, which had turned political alliance-making into a basic tenet of its policy. 
We saw earlier how MU in its state-making phase chose to reach out to communities to gain 
                                                
107 Records of debates in Mizoram State Assembly: Secretariat, Mizoram Legislative Assembly, Aizawl.  
108 Newslink (Aizawl) reported induction of many Chakmas and Brus into the party, noting, “this is in sharp 
contrast to MNF’s anti-Chakma ADC attitude in the past, when they were seated in the opposition benches” (27 
May 2003). 
109 MNF-Hmar Volunteer Welfare Association Agreement dated February 17, 1998. Personal papers of 
Hmingchungna, past President, HPC, Aizawl.   
110 BNLF and Mizoram Government signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 26 April 2005 (South Asia 
Intelligence Review,  3:42 (2 May 2005). 
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the upper hand in electoral politics rather than to ‘divide and rule’.  Perhaps an equally 
important incentive for political parties in Mizoram today is the need to project the state as the 
model for peace in the Northeast. Mizo leaders take immense pride in their state’s peaceful 
climate and have often offered themselves for services to neighbouring states as well as the 
central government to broker peace with insurgent groups in the region.111 Perhaps they also 
realise that the only way they can maintain peace in their state and retain their pride of place 
in the region is by being accommodating to those who could upset the applecart. 112     
 
Adding to the dynamic is the fact that the state in Mizoram enjoys greater legitimacy and a 
good public image. This could be on account of the state’s high degree of social control and 
the state-society compact.    Analysts see absence of enduring violence as an outcome of the  
people’s faith in the government’s capacity for fair play:                       
 
It is probably because the state functions in a just manner, transparently and is 
effective that has prevented the slide down. People have still not lost faith in the 
state’s capacity to govern. Frustration, ...has not become inconsolable.113  
 
The state’s capability is evident from the way public projects and programmes have been 
implemented. An example is the implementation of the Public Distribution System (PDS), a 
national food security programme, for which Mizoram has received wide acclaim.114 Crucial 
to the success of the programme has been involvement of civil society organisations like the 
YMA in implementation and monitoring. Wide public participation and sharing of 
information has helped prevent mismanagement and leakages, so common to implementation 
of PDS in other Indian states.115 A similar state-society partnership in promoting primary 
education has helped the state attain enviable levels of literacy. Serchip district recently 
created history by recording 100 % enrolment. The state has added other feathers to its cap. 
Recently, it claimed to be the first e-governance state in the North East and the first to 
introduce the Right to Information Act, an act likely to improve the quality of governance.116 
Its capability and effectiveness have helped the state retain its legitimacy in society. Thus in 
marked contrast to state-society dynamics in Manipur, social organisations in Mizoram, tied 
as they are to the state, have helped enhance the state’s capability and resultant legitimacy. 
This has prevented state-society contestation and has reinforced the positive inter-community 
dynamics in the state.  
 
                                                
111 ‘Centre asks Zoramthanga ….to talk to NSCN (IM)’, Times of India (Guwahati), 13 July 2004.   
112 It has been argued by Baruah that protective discrimination regimes, especially those seeking connection of 
group entitlements to collective goods (such as ADCs for specific communities), have exacerbated ethnic 
contestations in the North East (Baruah, 2005, p.11). This has found favour with other commentators (Chandoke, 
2005, p.25). While there may be a grain of truth in the contention, the crucial point is that protective 
discrimination regimes are not new to Indian policymaking; their legacy can be traced to colonial times. Hence it 
may be a bit late in the day to reverse their impact. Further, as demonstrated by the comparison of the state’s 
response to autonomy/decentralisation demands in Manipur and Mizoram, a policy favouring accommodation is 
better suited to maintaining peace than otherwise. Moreover, as again demonstrated by the two cases, demands 
for protective regimes become intense when groups begin to feel excluded. Demands for ‘homeland’ by 
Manipur’s minorities could be a case of playing out of competitive identity mobilisation. But underpinning these 
demands is the exclusion of minority communities from the power structure.        
113 Interview, Vanlalchuanna, Political analyst (Aizawl, 25 June 2004).  
114 ‘Successful BPL scheme’, North East Tribune (Aizawl), 19 June 2005.  
115 Based on discussion with R. Thanhawla, Secretary FCS Government of Mizoram (Aizawl, 2 July 2004). 
116 North East Tribune (Guwahati), 11 & 28 September 2005.  
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In Manipur, the state-making leaders’ politicising of Metei identity excluded minority 
communities and caused their alienation. This severely reduced the state’s legitimacy in the 
latter’s eyes. The state’s autonomy has also been constrained due to the poor authority it has 
been able to garner historically. This has affected the state’s capacity to manage and resolve 
conflicts. Social organisations that have leveraged traditional centres of authority have 
mobilised against each other in an attempt to wrest resources and benefits and authority. The 
result has been a cycle of conflicts. In Mizoram, state-making leaders politicised Mizo 
identity for the same purpose. But they imagined Mizo identity in inclusive terms and kept it 
open to all communities, thus enhancing their legitimacy. The process of state-making itself 
consolidated the state’s hold over power at the cost of traditional centres of authority, thus 
enhancing state’s autonomy. The close working relationship between key social organisations 
and the state institutions in Mizoram has further helped this process of consolidation. This has 
helped resolve conflicts and maintain peace.  
 
Conclusion  
I began this paper by arguing that divergence in violent outcomes between Manipur and 
Mizoram can be explained best by looking at the processes of state-making in the two states 
and the contrasting ways in which state-making leaders and those who were opposing them 
mobilised their constituencies to capture power in the early years of state-making. This had 
implications for the state’s capacity to govern, and specifically its readiness to respond to 
group aspirations. Where the state has been responsive and inclusive, it has avoided cycles of 
conflict and violence. On the other hand, the state’s reluctance to respond to minority 
aspirations provides the material for sustained violence and breakdown. What are the lessons 
that we can derive from this analysis? 
  
Firstly, the authority of the state depends on where state power lies. In the state-making 
period, state elites and key social forces have been engaged in long drawn out struggles over 
control. Where state elites succeeded in incorporating social forces into state structures, their 
authority has been augmented, while that of competing social forces has declined. Where 
social forces were not incorporated, or where the state sought to ride piggyback on pre-
existing centres of authority, state power was compromised. The role of the colonial state was 
significant in this process in both Manipur and Mizoram. What is remarkable is that the 
colonial administration was employing two very different strategies in its attempt to rule 
tracts of adjoining territory. In Mizoram, even though the conquest had been designed initially 
to prevent Lushai chiefs from raiding the plains areas in Bengal, the colonial state was taking 
a more proactive role and interest. Through ruling by proxy with the help of chiefs, the state 
sought to get closer to the people and ground itself in Lushai society.  
 
In Manipur, the state remained a distant lord. Its presence in the hills was marginal. Pre-
existing institutions and power centres among tribal communities continued to rule with only 
small adjustments. In the valley, the state was at best an overseer of proceedings. This was 
partly due to the presence of a developed polity that the colonial state encountered in the state 
in the form of the Metei kingship. Cultural considerations may also have prevented the state 
from attempting to ground itself in Hinduized Metei society. In Mizoram, the state actively 
used Christian missionaries as agents of social change among hitherto animist tribes. 
Missionary activity helped enhance the state’s legitimacy in society. The colonial state was 
therefore better integrated in Lushai hills than it was in the Manipur kingdom. The result of 
this integration was a consolidated state-making exercise.                 
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Secondly, the colonial legacy has implications for strategies used by the elite in their post-
colonial state-making efforts. Literature abounds on how ruling coalitions have used a variety 
of tools for this purpose: from electoral incorporation, to state patronage and programmatic 
reforms, to developing organisational capacity to govern or simply by repression.117 Where 
does the Northeast example fit in this context? Are there other strategies that ruling coalitions 
in Manipur and Mizoram have used for their state-making objectives? Political parties and 
other elites have frequently politicised ethnic identities in the region in their struggles over 
power and authority. Ethnic mobilisation, therefore, may be serving objectives that electoral 
incorporation or land reforms may have served elsewhere. However, empirical material 
proves that ethnic mobilisation can be a double-edged sword: it can reinforce the state and 
enhance its overall capacity and legitimacy in society; but it can also diminish its strengths, 
compromise its legitimacy and further fragment society. That outcome will depend on 
whether identity construction and mobilisation is inclusive and aggregative, or partisan and 
exclusionary. The manner of identity mobilisation thus has serious consequences for inter-
community relations and violence.          
 
Thirdly, the state’s role in managing the aspirations of minority communities plays a big part 
in how those communities mobilise. Where the state is seen as being accessible to minorities, 
chances are these communities will have a stake in upholding the system. Administrative 
arrangements enabling self-governance for minority tribes in Mizoram has meant that elite 
and even more restive elements from these communities have been incorporated into the 
state’s political system, thus taking their attention away from the need to mobilise for a share 
of power. Similar patterns of relationships between elites among minorities and mainstream 
political parties have also been forged as an outcome of the political process. These 
relationships have helped reduce intercommunity tensions in Mizoram. Manipur’s heightened 
contestations could be the outcome of perceptions among minorities that the state was 
reluctant to share power and resources with them.                
 
Lastly, a common strategy used by state elites to enhance state authority has been to develop 
their organisational capacity. This has usually implied working through political and state 
institutions. Material from Mizoram demonstrates that beyond state organisations, it is social 
organisations that elites have fostered to help enhance the state’s capability. The YMA and 
the Church have had established patterns of relationship with the state in Mizoram. The 
strength of these organisations has been used by state elites to reinforce the state’s capacity. 
This state-society bonding, largely an outcome of the historical process, has helped prevent 
fragmentation in politics. It has fostered stability and order. In Manipur, the state-society 
break and fragmentation of social forces themselves has led to a rising spiral of competitive 
mobilisation between different social organisations and the state. Resultant poor state 
autonomy has led to social forces constraining the state from behaving in ways that could be 
seen by all groups as fair and objective.     
                                                
117 Deborah Yashar, Demanding Democracy: Reform and Reaction in Costa Rica and Guatemala (1870s-1950s), 
Stanford: Staford University Press, 1997, pp.215-229.   
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